Balancing Research Security and Openness
In โThe Trap of Securitizing Scienceโ (Issues, Fall 2024), Tommy Shih and Caroline S. Wagner provide a long-overdue warning: to consider the costs of the securitization of science on the progress of science itself. They urge taking a step back from an ever-accelerating spiral of desperate reactions. Here I would like to add a European perspective.
When it comes to international cooperation, there is now more knowledge and awareness of the risks of technology drain, the various dual use potentials and dilemmas, and the political and strategic misuse of research and its outcomes. But overall, it is actually an information deficit that is driving the securitization raceโa lack of comprehensive and accurate information about what is going on in China and what is influencing partners there, and how exactly this could ultimately threaten all kinds of security, including in Europe.
Individual analyses that claim to inform us about what is happening in China, and that tell the worst and most pointed stories and issue the sharpest warnings, get the biggest stage. This is not surprising. It is easier (and faster) to quote from speeches and documents from the central government, controlled by the Chinese Communist Party, than to gather empirical evidence on how calls for political streamlining of research are received by scientists on the ground and affect collaboration. It is simpler to see the harsh rhetoric than to point to other statements, often in the same texts, that emphasize the global nature and the openness of science, Chinaโs commitment to contribute to it, and the need for international collaboration to address humanityโs grand challengesโand to press Chinese counterparts on these commitments. It seems more logical to imagine an omnipotent central government that directs all actions according to a grand strategy of global (including technological) domination, than to study where these attempts still fail or meet considerable resistance and counteraction among scientists and scholars who have intrinsic academic motivations and are interested in global cooperation. It seems smarter (and gets more attention) to warn against what is formulated in China as a โunited frontโ approach, which in theory (and in the dreams of the political leadership) means that any Chinese citizen can be used as a nonconventional spy, than to develop informed, sophisticated, precise, and legally, humanely, and democratically fair case-by-case reviews to understand and prevent the actual use of this tool and other risky options in scientific cooperation.
Given these trends, it is not surprising that science managers and politicians in Europe, often under increasing pressure from their (arguably better equipped) American partners, are considering turning to blanket measures. And that they are struggling to gather sufficient credible information on which to base their actions.
Better screening of risks and potentials for responsible international cooperation and scientific progress is tedious, does not happen overnight, and requires resources. I sometimes wonder whether this has been sufficiently recognized, and whether it will ever translate into a willingness to fund sustainable capacities and procedures in this regard, to follow actual developments in China, and to maintain dialogues with scientific colleagues there on these issues, even under increasingly difficult circumstances.
Anna Lisa Ahlers
Head, Lise Meitner Research Group-China in the Global System of Science
Max Planck Institute for the History of Science, Berlin
Professor II, Department of Culture Studies and Oriental Languages
University of Oslo
Tommy Shih and Caroline S. Wagner provide vital analysis for policymakers and educators seeking to navigate the evolving dynamics of international scientific cooperation. Not long ago, US-China scientific collaboration and educational exchange served as a stabilizing force in international relations. With the accelerated pace of transformative basic research and technological competition, however, a sustained decoupling between the two nations now appears likely, with each side attributing blame to the other.
As Shih and Wagner highlight, US-China scientific collaboration long proved mutually advantageous, fostering significant advancements across fields. China-US collaborative research not only garnered higher citations compared with work produced independently by researchers from either country, but also the concentration of influential papers resulting from such collaborations consistently exceeded those from purely domestic research. Yet the current decline in such collaborationsโevident from the drop in coauthored publications since 2018โsignals a concerning trajectory that threatens bilateral relations and the broader global scientific ecosystem.
The economic costs of securitization, as the authors note, are profound. Decoupling undermines innovation and introduces inefficiencies, while the contributions of skilled immigrants and international students, particularly Chinese nationals, to the US economy and labor market cannot be overstated. For example, in 2018, the last year of available data before the confounding effects of COVID-19 and a flare-up in US-China political tensions, Chinese students contributed nearly $15 billion to the US economy. However, policies such as the US Department of Justiceโs China Initiative may inadvertently fuel a damaging brain drain, deviating from their original intent. More broadly, measures such as increased oversight of international collaborations, restrictions on researcher exchanges, and the lapse of the US-China Agreement on Cooperation in Science and Technology also reflect a turn toward protectionism.
Shih and Wagner argue convincingly that over-securitization erodes the foundational principles of openness, trust, and reciprocity that historically underpin scientific progress. This challenge is particularly acute in areas requiring global cooperation, such as climate change, public health, and emerging technologies. Their pragmatic frameworkโโas secure as needed, as open as possibleโโoffers a thoughtful approach to navigating these complexities, though it must be underpinned by a mutual commitment to rebuilding trust.
Scientific communities in both countries must leverage their networks to foster dialogue amid geopolitical tensions. For the United States, it is essential to distinguish academic integrity and research security from national security concerns, avoiding broad generalizations that stigmatize anyone, including scholars, from China. For its part, China must address global concerns around intellectual property, research transparency, and ethical standards. Strengthening domestic research governance and aligning it with international norms can help counter the suspicions that drive securitization in the West.
The US National Science Foundationโs Safeguarding the Entire Community of the US Research Ecosystem (SECURE) program exemplifies efforts to balance research integrity with international collaboration. Similar initiatives in China emphasizing transparency, accountability, and ethical practices could enhance its position as a global science leader while fostering a more collaborative and stable international research environment. For instance, Chinese scholars and students preparing to visit abroad must understand and adhere to the scientific norms, research ethics, and regulations of their host countries.
As good news, Shih and Wagnerโs analysis underscores that balancing security and openness, while challenging, is achievable. By cultivating trust, transparency, and reciprocity, the global scientific community can navigate these tensions and continue driving progress in an interconnected world.
Li Tang
Professor, School of International Relations and Public Affairs
Fudan University, Shanghai, China
Tommy Shih and Caroline S. Wagner provide an important wake-up call to US policymakers responsible for managing international science and technology. In September 2023, the National Science and Technology Council released a critical report declaring that the United States had unleveraged, underachieved, and essentially mismanaged much of its bilateral S&T cooperation arrangements, and that the government needed to do a better job of ensuring desired outcomes. This reflects a critical gap, as the United Statesโ influence in the world is underpinned by its considerable strengths in science and technology.
The simple fact is that the United States has failed to appreciate the increasing importance of its cooperative S&T relationships not only as a tool of foreign policy but also (and even more critically) as a tool for advancing science and technology progress domestically and across the world. Too many people in the Department of State and related agencies see international cooperation as something โniceโ to do, but rarely do they see these activities in strategic terms. This is quite clear in the case of the US-Sino bilateral S&T relationship. While the United States has seen cooperation as simply icing on the cake, China has seen it as the cake itself. Accusations that China has gotten the better end of this cooperation miss the point entirely. In fact, China should be applauded for recognizing the value of its growing number of S&T cooperation agreements around the world. This helps explain why Chinaโs leader, Xi Jinping, remains intent on retaining S&T linkages with the United States even as the overall bilateral political relationship continues to sour.
Shih and Wagner are right when they point out that cross-border collaboration, generally speaking, produces better science because of the synergies generated among the nations involved. Itโs true that during the 1980s and โ90s, China was still very much a developing country, and that there was a great degree of asymmetry between it and the United States in terms of S&T capabilities and performance. But this has all changed, with the result being that the United States is now strategically positioned to capture a great deal of benefit from the progress China has made. Yet ironically, at the very moment when the United States should be engaging more deeply with the โemerging pockets of excellenceโ within Chinaโs S&T system, US leaders seem to want to disengage, delink, and decouple. If these leaders better appreciated the value of cooperationโprecisely what Shih and Wagner illustrate through data and analysisโthey might reconsider their tendency to overstate the risks and understate the potential benefits. To have any hope of resolving the broad array of S&T-related global challenge issues, the United States must figure out how to work with China and other countries in a more constructive way. It will be necessary to build more bridges and not tear apart existing ones. That is why renewal of the US-China Agreement of Cooperation in Science and Technologyโadopted in 1979 but recently allowed to lapseโis more important than ever.
Moreover, action is needed to fortify the ranks of officials at the State Department and related agencies who deal with international S&T cooperation. One useful step would be to create a special โconeโ within these organizations to ensure that the policymaking apparatus has an ample number of professionals with backgrounds in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. The United States must simply stop leaving so much on the table when it comes to working with other countries, whether in bilateral or multilateral frameworks.
Denis Simon
Non-Resident Research Fellow
Quincy Institute for International Statecraft