US Research in Retreat?

“Reconsidering Research Security” (Issues, Winter 2025), by John C. Gannon, Richard A. Meserve, and Maria T. Zuber, is a superb synthesis of policies and actions necessary to implement a wise risk-management process of government-funded basic research as well as to ensure the United States continues to be the world leader in science and technology. The authors have focused on the current conflict and competition between the United States and China that have increased bipartisan concern about the policies, intentions, actions, and achievements of China as it builds economic power, defense capabilities, and advanced technology leadership. China is making vast investments in fields related to emerging technologies (with DeepSeek being the latest example in artificial intelligence), and has engaged at times in patent infringement, technology theft, malign foreign talent programs, and espionage.

Like many observers, including myself, the authors did not foresee the dramatic and devastating blows by the Trump administration against our national science and technology (S&T) enterprise. The bipartisan support for ensuring the well-being of America’s S&T enterprise—seen as essential for our security, economic competitiveness, health, and well-being—lasted for 80 years, but it has now ended. Young and senior scientists alike are losing their jobs, funding is being cut for research, premier government agencies dealing with S&T and leading research universities are being harmed, and the pipeline for the next generation of researchers in S&T is at risk.

I have engaged with the S&T enterprise in China for 35 years. My most recent trip to China was as a member of the US delegation to the International Union of Pure and Applied Physics General Assembly in 2024. Based on what I have seen over three decades, China has become extraordinarily capable in science, technology, and innovation, and we may have as much to learn from its scientific advances as vice versa.

I continue to believe that scientific engagement with China and other countries in basic research is still in the US national interest if done with our “eyes wide open” about potential security risks and appropriate risk assessment and mitigation procedures are in place. I did have concerns that the balance between research openness and security for fundamental research might tip too far toward the security side. That could harm the ability of the United States to remain the global leader in S&T and innovation, attract talented people from around the world, and be aware of new scientific and technological advances in China. I have become more optimistic—thanks to the Gannon, Meserve, and Zuber article—that the engagement and dialogue on research security carried out by US university leaders, researchers, and government funding, security, and law enforcement agencies is leading to a more nuanced and informed risk assessment process that can make careful judgments on how to reduce the risks on many basic research projects, while still achieving the benefits of the research and engaging with leading researchers in other countries.

All that progress in sustaining the prominence of America’s science, technology, and innovation enterprise with appropriate research security will be compromised by the actions being taken by the Trump administration. The outcome will be the United States relinquishing its leadership to China and creating new threats for our security, economic competitiveness, and prosperity.

E. William Colglazier

I was a member of the National Science, Technology, and Security Roundtable at the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, and for the last six years I also experienced the challenges of addressing research security as a chief research officer of an R1 university, so designated for its very high research spending and doctorate production. In their essay for Issues, the roundtable’s cochairs, John C. Gannon, Richard A. Meserve, and Maria T. Zuber, explained the stages we went through to define, understand, and address a dynamic situation that was initially exasperated by suspicion and denial, and made even more challenging by a fast-reacting adversary. The authors also expressed clearly the consensus of the academic research community and federal agencies on the seriousness of the threat to the US research enterprise, as well as the importance of both offensive and defensive measures to protect against such threats.

Here, I want to highlight some of the proposed solutions—and express views I have since gained as I became more aware of views from outside the United States on US-versus-Chinese science and technologies. I will start by highlighting that competitors have become more serious players in creating the basic sciences behind future technologies. This is illustrated by various surveys showing that the United States no longer leads in publications or patents, which are the seeds of future industries. And while it was previously assumed that China is a follower or copier, it has in recent years invested in its universities and research laboratories, becoming a leader in generating quality fundamental as well as applied research. In other words, it is no longer simply Chinese technology that is competing with US technologies, but rather that its fundamental science corps is now on par with—and in some cases ahead of—its US counterparts.

More importantly, the derivative is in the wrong direction: China is doubling down on investment in scientific research, while we are reducing ours. Another concern is that by becoming timid and deciding to bunker ourselves to reduce leakage of research, the United States has reduced the likelihood of innovative research ideas getting in. I witnessed this firsthand recently as I was discussing research collaborations between various international universities and leading American ones. I was surprised to hear that the internationals no longer consider US science and technology best-in-class, and that in many cases they were more inclined to collaborate with non-Western partners or purchase non-Western equipment.

The United States, with 5% of the world’s population, produced much of the world’s science and technology—largely because it attracted the world’s best and the brightest because of their belief that US universities provided the best environment for research. If the impression takes hold that the United States is retreating, or that it is no longer the leader, we will lose that qualitative edge and become a less desirable destination and collaborator. However, if our competitors remain closed to outsiders, the United States would be positioned to reclaim its role as the scientific leader and to both share and protect its research products.

Chaouki T. Abdallah

Congress mandated the creation of the National Academies Roundtable on Science, Technology, and Security to address concern that untoward and illicit actions by China and other countries posed serious risks to American security and economic preeminence. John C. Gannon, Richard A. Meserve, and Maria T. Zuber, who cochaired the roundtable, correctly conclude that zealous measures to defend against foreign exploitation of university-based research would be inadequate to preserve US preeminence in science and technology (S&T) without much greater effort to strengthen US capabilities.

I was privileged to serve as a member of the roundtable and am both heartened and deeply disturbed by what we learned. As their article’s summary of key observations makes clear, the magnitude and efficacy of untoward foreign government actions to exploit American university-based research are less than feared, awareness and understanding of the problem in academic institutions and federal funding agencies have improved greatly, and steps underway to ameliorate the problem without seriously damaging the efficacy of open research appear promising. But as the authors also make clear, illicit foreign actions to exploit American S&T are neither the only nor most serious threats to sustained US preeminence and the security and competitive advantages it provides. We have a “Pogo problem.”

The comic strip character Pogo once famously said, “We have met the enemy and he is us.” The roundtable pulled together findings from multiple studies that revealed serious and worsening internal threats to US S&T capacity and preeminence. They also demonstrated that some of the adopted and proposed measures to prevent foreign exploitation will make the internal weaknesses greater and accelerate the relative and absolute decline of US capacity.

For example, as the authors correctly emphasized, the nation needs to give immediate and serious attention to factors that limit the ability of secondary schools to interest and educate young people in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. We do not now graduate enough seniors interested in STEM fields to fill university classes or existing corporate demand for scientists and technicians. Our broken immigration system compounds the problem in ways that reduce domestic capacity and shift commercial application of discoveries to other countries with better-prepared workforces. The already serious problems are further compounded by research security demands that effectively drive smaller research universities out of the game by making it too costly to utilize available talent or compete for federal grants.

As a member of the roundtable, I fully endorse the conclusions of our cochairs and their call for approaches that emphasize maintaining and improving US STEM capacity more than limited utility efforts to build perfect defenses against exaggerated foreign threats. We must revitalize and adapt the policies that made the United States preeminent if we are to regain and retain that status.

Thomas Fingar